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NOTE
CHILD CUSTODY MODIFICATION BASED ON A PARENT'S
NON-MARITAL COHABITATION: PROTECTING THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD IN VIRGINIA
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, courts have been faced with deciding what constitutes
"parental fitness" for custody purposes in light of society's changing mo-
res and values. In attempting to define the role that a parent's sexual
lifestyle plays in a custody or visitation dispute, courts across the country
have lost sight of their ultimate responsibility - to protect the best inter-
ests of the child. Instead, courts often seem more concerned with protect-
ing the sexual freedom of unmarried parents than in contemplating the
impact cohabitation may have on children. The Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia is no exception.
This Note seeks to provide a psychological and sociological basis for the
Supreme Court of Virginia's conclusion that children are likely to be
harmed when exposed to a parent's unmarried cohabitation. Specifically,
section two presents a recent study of the effects of new parental relation-
ships following separation or divorce on a child's emotional well-being.1
Section three examines the supreme court's approach to the issue of un-
married cohabitation in custody determinations. 2 Finally, section four
discusses recent Court of Appeals of Virginia decisions which are contrary
to the Supreme Court of Virginia's precedent.3 Section five concludes by
suggesting that a rebuttable presumption that unmarried cohabitation is
harmful to a child would be a workable middle ground approach better
suited to meet the child's best interests."
Overall, this Note shows that there is a firm foundation for the su-
preme court's finding that unmarried cohabitation adversely affects the
mental and emotional health of children exposed to such a relationship.
1. See infra notes 7-28 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 29-74 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 75-136 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 137-46 and accompanying test.
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The primary purpose of any child custody determination should be deter-
mining which parent is most capable of serving the child's best interests.
A per se rule which automatically mandates removing children from an
unmarried cohabiting parent's custody is almost universally considered
too harsh a standard by which to make such a decision. However, the
current trend of many courts, including the Court of Appeals of Virginia,
is to effectively ignore evidence of cohabitation unless the trial court finds
immediate evidence of harm to the children. Clearly, this is antithetical
to both Supreme Court of Virginia precedent and psychological findings
that cohabitation by its very nature affects children, although the effects
may take several years to manifest.5
Because the standard adopted by the court of appeals insists upon im-
mediate evidence of harm to children, parents who seek to modify a cus-
tody arrangement based on their objection to the custodial parent's non-
marital cohabitation are faced with an almost impossible burden of proof.
Virginia appellate case law has recently reduced cohabitation from a
seemingly conclusive finding of unfitness to a virtually irrelevant factor in
determining custody.6 This has left trial courts free to disregard cohabita-
tion as a factor in a child's upbringing. By refusing to give meaningful
effect to the presumption apparently made by the supreme court, the
court of appeals has subordinated the child's best interests to the parent's
desire for sexual freedom.
II. EFFECTS OF A PARENT'S NON-MARITAL COHABITATION ON CHILDREN
The effects of new parental relationships following separation or di-
vorce on a child's well-being have been documented. According to a 1988
study at the Philadelphia Child Guidance Clinic,7 child adjustment varied
among four categories of what it termed parental "blending:" (a) remar-
riage, (b) living together but not remarried, (c) seriously involved but not
living together, and (d) not seriously involved.' Operating from the pre-
mise that children of divorce are influenced by the new relationships their
parents establish,9 the study tracked eighty-seven families in which
mothers had custody."° The researchers examined the differences in the
children's behavioral, emotional, and social adjustment over the first five
years following their parents' separation.1 The children were evaluated
5. See infra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 84-136 and accompanying text.
7. Marla B. Isaacs & George H. Leon, Remarriage and Its Alternatives Following Di-
vorce: Mother and Child Adjustment, 14 J. MARrrAL & FAM. THERAPY 163 (1988).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 165. Isaacs and Leon acknowledged that their study was not exhaustive, as it
did not consider the father's "blending status." Id. at 171.
11. Id. at 165.
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for behavioral problems 2 and social competence i3 based on a checklist
completed by only the mothers.1' By the fifth year of separation, twenty
percent of the women had remarried, thirteen percent had not remarried
but were living with a new partner,' 5 and twenty-two percent were seri-
ously involved but not living with a new partner. Forty-six percent of the
mothers were not seriously involved with a new partner at the time of the
fifth-year interview.'"
The results of the study were dramatic. Only one blending arrangement
had a statistically significant effect on the child's adjustment - where
the mother was unmarried but living with her new partner: 7
Those children whose mothers had not remarried but were living with their
new partners, [sic] were more maladjusted than the children in any other
arrangement, including those whose mothers were not involved. This was
true even when the child's age and sex as well as the mother's own adjust-
ment levels were taken into account. Furthermore, it is apparent that these
differences in adjustment cannot be explained by differences [in the chil-
dren] that may have existed prior to blending. 8
Children whose mothers had live-in partners had a greater degree of mal-
adjustment, evidenced by substantially higher scores for behavior
problems. 9 Their poor adjustment was similarly reflected by lower scores
on the social competence scale,'20 with older children and adolescents ex-
periencing the greatest difficulty."' Thus, in a situation where an unmar-
ried mother lived with her partner, a "deleterious effect on child out-
come" resulted." The most well-adjusted group with respect to both
behavior problems and social competence were those children whose
12. "Behavior problems included both negatively valued acts against persons or objects
and inner discomfort experienced by the child." Id. at 166.
13. "Social competence tapped adaptive functioning in terms of participation in a variety
of typical childhood activities such as chores, sports and hobbies, as well as social relation-
ships and academic performance." Id.
14. Id.
15. In the study, the term "partner" was not gender-specific, making it unclear whether
the partner was always male.
16. Isaacs & Leon, supra note 7, at 167.
17. Id. at 169.
18. Id. at 171.
19. Id. at 168.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 169.
22. Id. It is not the author's intention, in relying on this study, to perpetuate or validate
the double standard applied when courts demand that mothers, but not fathers, lose cus-
tody of their children when they choose to be sexually active outside marriage. See gener-
ally Donald H. Stone, Child Custody and the Live-In Lover: An Empirical Study, 11 PACE
L. REv. 1, 35-37 (1990). In the absence of a father-focused study, however, the research
results indicate that the adverse effect on children comes not from the fact that the mother
has brought a partner into their home, but that the custodial parent has introduced his or
her lover into the family household.
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mothers were not involved with a new partner, followed closely by those
whose mothers had remarried.2 3
The researchers offered several reasons why the mother's cohabitation
without marriage created problems for children. First, without the com-
mitment and stability marriage signals, children may be insecure about
the relationship between their mother and her new partner, and their own
relationship with the partner.24 Second, the mother's partner has an am-
biguous status in the family. The boundaries of family membership are
not clearly defined, and the partner is unable to assume a stable place in
the home in terms of rules, discipline, and even nurturing.25 Third, the
child's father may object to his child's presence in such a living arrange-
ment, and he may communicate his disapproval to the child.2 Fourth, the
child may be both troubled about the morality of the living situation and
embarrassed by having to explain the relationship to others.2 7 Finally, if a
heightened sexuality exists between the couple, it may result in the
mother redirecting her interest from the children, even if temporarily, to-
ward her partner.2 8
III. THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA AND THE PRESUMPTION OF HARM
FROM UNMARRIED COHABITATION
A. Overview
In custody disputes where a parent openly cohabits with a partner,
courts have taken one of two approaches in determining whether to mod-
ify a custody award.29 The "per se" standard leads courts to automatically
remove custody from the cohabitating parent." The "nexus" approach,
however, is used by courts that wish to determine whether there is con-
crete evidence which shows a present, adverse effect on the child.3 1 Cus-
23. Isaacs and Leon, supra note 7, at 168.
24. Id. at 171.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. Despite these troubling findings, the researchers stop short of advocating that un-
married mothers not live with a partner, noting that such advice might cause the mother to
resent her children. Id. at 172. However, the study suggested that clinicians should be
alerted that "more work may be indicated for families with such arrangements." Id. In any
event, it is clear that what is best for the parent is not necessarily best for the child.
29. See Robert A. Beargie, Custody Determinations Involving the Homosexual Parent,
22 FAM. L.Q. 71, 74-78 (1988), for three approaches courts have taken when determining the
fitness of a homosexual parent.
30. Id. For a rather critical review of decisions based on the per se approach, see Stone,
supra note 22, at 18-26.
31. See Stone, supra note 22, at 26-40, for a comparative review of sixty-three appellate
custody cases in which the nexus approach was utilized. Stone believes that a standard
[Vol. 27:915
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tody is removed from the cohabiting parent only if the court finds such
evidence.3
2
It is debatable whether the Supreme Court of Virginia has utilized the
per se approach when confronted with custody issues involving cohabitat-
ing parents.33 The court has consistently ruled that simply exposing a
child to unmarried cohabitation is sufficient to warrant a change in cus-
tody.34 In several recent cases, however, the appellate court has acknowl-
edged supreme court precedent yet allowed the cohabiting parent to re-
tain custody. By requiring proof that the cohabitation results in
immediate harm to the child and by evaluating the extent of the child's
exposure to the intimate nature of the relationship, the court of appeals
has implicitly rejected the supreme court's presumption that unmarried
cohabitation adversely affects children.
A. Brown v. Brown
Brown v. Brown,35 decided in 1977, is the most recent supreme court
case where a mother's non-marital relationship resulted in a finding of
unfitness, requiring removal of the children from her custody. The trial
court transferred custody of the couple's two children, ages four and
seven, to their father, based on evidence that while the mother had cus-
tody of the children, she lived with her paramour in an adulterous rela-
tionship.36 Despite evidence which indicated that Mrs. Brown was a poor
housekeeper and sometimes neglected the children, 37 the trial court held
that solely by reason of her adulterous cohabitation she was unfit to be a
which demands proof of "actual concrete harm" before removing children from a cohabiting
parent is "enlightened." Id. at 31.
32. Id. at 18.
33. See infra notes 35-70 and accompanying text. For an excellent analysis of factors used
by Virginia courts in determining child custody, see also PETER N. SWISHER, et al, VIRGINIA
FAMILY LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE § 15-7 (1991 ed. & Supp. 1992).
34. See Brown v. Brown, 218 Va. 196, 200, 237 S.E.2d 89, 91-92 (1977); Roe v. Roe, 228
Va. 722, 728, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (1985).
35. 218 Va. 196, 237 S.E.2d 89 (1977).
36. Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Brown had been awarded an absolute divorce at the time of the
trial. Brown, 218 Va. at 197, 237 S.E.2d at 90. Mrs. Brown testified that she planned to
marry her boyfriend once her divorce was final. Id. at 198, 237 S.E.2d at 91.
37. Id. at 198, 237 S.E.2d at 90. The trial court was satisfied that Mrs. Brown "was fit to
care for her children so far as her treatment of the children and their physical care is con-
cerned." Id. at 197, 237 S.E.2d at 90.
1993]
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custodial parent.38 The trial court specifically stated that it was satisfied
that she was "otherwise a fit mother. . .."39
The supreme court emphasized that all custody cases are primarily
concerned with the best interests of the child, which are determined by
considering all of the facts, including the "moral climate" of the custodial
parent's household and the effect that a parent's non-marital relationship
has on the child.4 0 Because children learn by their parents' example,
"[s]uch utter disregard for moral guidance and social standards can have
but ill effect on the [child]."'" The supreme court thus presumed that
non-marital cohabitation has a detrimental effect on a child living in the
same home.
While the court declared that adultery alone is an insufficient reason to
declare a parent an unfit custodian.42 It emphasized that "[a]n illicit rela-
tionship to which minor children are exposed cannot be condoned. '43 The
38. Id. at 198, 237 S.E.2d at 91. The supreme court later confirmed that non-marital co-
habitation was the only factor involved in removing custody from the mother:
In Brown, we affirmed a chancellor's decision to remove the custody of two [children]
from their mother, who was otherwise a fit custodian, on the sole ground that she was
openly living in an adulterous relationship with a male lover, in the same home as the
children, during the pendency of the divorce suit.
Roe v. Roe, 228 Va. 722, 726, 324 S.E.2d 691, 693 (1985) (emphasis added).
39. The trial court ruled as follows:
[Wihile the Court was satisfied that [Mrs. Brown] was otherwise a fit mother and did
not find her unfit due to any deficiency in the care of the children while in her cus-
tody, the court found, by reason of her adulterous relationship with [her lover] in the
same residence of which the minor children also lived, that [she] was not a fit and
proper person to have the care and custody of the minor children of the parties.
Id. at 199, 237 S.E.2d at 91.
40. Id. The double standard applied to Mrs. and Mr. Brown by the trial court was also
applied by the supreme court, which considered adultery to be a reflection of a mother's
moral values but, interestingly, failed to consider the reflection of a father's adultery on his
moral values. Mr. Brown was also involved in an adulterous relationship while he had cus-
tody of the children pending appeal by the mother. Mr. Brown's girlfriend admitted that
she and Mr. Brown were "lovers," but not surprisingly claimed that this relationship was
-never obvious in front of the children," and that she and Mr. Brown planned to marry
when his divorce became final. Id. at 197, 237 S.E.2d at 90. It is unclear from the case
whether Mr. Brown's girlfriend actually lived with him, or simply spent the night on occa-
sion. The trial court, however, accepted that the children had not been "exposed" to their
relationship. This fact raises a troubling issue, in that if both parents are involved in adul-
terous relationships, it becomes difficult to apply presumptions of any kind.
41. Id. at 199, 237 S.E.2d at 91 (emphasis added) (quoting Beck v. Beck, 341 So. 2d 580,
582 (La. App. 1977)).
42. Id. at 200, 237 S.E.2d at 91 (citing In re Marriage of J-H-M- and E-C-M-, 544 S.W.2d
582, 585 (Mo. App. 1976)).
43. Id. at 199, 237 S.E.2d at 91 (emphasis added). While courts often refer to cohabitation
as involving "immoral" or "illicit" sexual conduct, this comment does not purport to make
any judgment about the morality of any particular lifestyle. This Comment's purpose is to
stress that, despite society's increased tolerance for a variety of sexual lifestyles, there is
psychological evidence that children are being allowed to suffer the emotional consequences
[Vol. 27:915
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supreme court thus unanimously affirmed the trial court's ruling that, be-
cause Mrs. Brown was "openly cohabiting" in her children's presence, she
was unfit to retain custody."4 The Brown court focused on two concerns:
first, determining what effect non-marital cohabitation has on children
and second, protecting children from exposure to such a living arrange-
ment. The court presumed that non-marital cohabitation has a detrimen-
tal effect on a child living in the same house.45 The court therefore did
not require the impact of cohabitation on the children to be proven by
evidence at trial. Nevertheless, the court recognized testimony that the
cohabitation had adversely affected at least one of the children. 40
Despite the troubling aspects of Brown,47 the court clearly distin-
guished adultery outside the presence of the child from open cohabita-
tion.48 The court viewed open cohabitation as inevitably adversely im-
pacting the child,49 because the child would have knowledge of his or her
parent's sexual misconduct.50 Because this argument provided the foun-
dation for the Brown decision, many practitioners interpreted it to mean
that a parent who engages in unmarried cohabitation is per se unfit for
custody.51 The supreme court probably stopped short of fashioning a per
se rule by requiring that non-marital cohabitation be given "the most
careful consideration in a custody proceeding." 52 At the very least, how-
ever, Brown requires Virginia courts to presume that such relationships
are harmful to children.
of their parents' sexual choices because courts no longer treat unmarried cohabitation as
potentially detrimental to children.
44. Brown, 218 Va. at 200, 237 S.E.2d at 92. The supreme court emphasized that the
decision of the trial court was entitled to deference and, in the absence of an abuse of dis-
cretion, the supreme court would not reverse the trial court's decision. Id. at 200-201, 237
S.E.2d at 92.
45. See supra text accompanying note 41.
46. Brown, 218 Va. at 200, 237 S.E.2d at 92. This minor aspect of Brown was later
stretched to the extent that it became the critical test applied by the court of appeals to the
issue of custody modification. See infra text accompanying notes 119-130.
47. See supra note 40.
48. Brown, 218 Va. at 200, 237 S.E.2d at 91-92. It is unclear whether the court considered
sexual activity behind closed doors to be "outside the presence" of the child.
49. See supra text accompanying note 41.
50. Brown, 218 Va. at 200, 237 S.E.2d at 92 (quoting In re Marriage of J-H-M- and E-C-
M-, 544 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Mo. App. 1976)).
51. See P=TER N. SWISHER, supra note 33, § 15-7, at 56 (Supp. 1992); Letter from James
Ray Cottrell, Gannon, Cottrell & Ward, P.C., to Katharine A. Salmon, Staff Member, Uni-
versity of Richmond Law Review 1 (June 1, 1993) (on file with the author); see also Stone,
supra note 22, at 18 n.39 (categorizing Brown as a per se case). Contra Letter from Law-
rence D. Diehl, Esq., to Katharine A. Salmon, Staff Member, University of Richmond Law
Review 1 (Mar. 30, 1993) (on file with the author) (opining that Brown was never a per se
rule).
52. Brown, 218 Va. at 199, 287 S.E.2d at 91.
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B. Roe v. Roe
Roe v. Roe5" gave the supreme court the opportunity to reiterate that
Brown v. Brown was not concerned with a mother's adulterous relation-
ship in the abstract, but with the fact that it was conducted in her chil-
dren's presence. 4 The court repeated that when children are subjected to
their mother's "open and public adultery with her paramour for a sub-
stantial period of time, in total disregard of the moral principles of our
society, the mother is generally held morally unfit for custody."55
In Roe, the supreme court considered another custody dispute which
involved a parent's cohabitation. After the Roe's divorce, Mrs. Roe re-
tained custody of the couple's only child. Several years later, Mrs. Roe
was stricken with cancer and, physically unable to care for her daughter,
consented to a decree awarding custody to the child's father.5" Four years
later, Mrs. Roe discovered that Mr. Roe was living with his homosexual
lover in the house where her daughter lived.57 In her petition to have per-
manent custody returned to her, she alleged that the child had seen the
two men hugging, kissing, and sleeping in bed together.58
The trial court found that each parent had been a "fit, devoted, and
competent custodian," and that there was "no evidence that the father's
conduct had an adverse effect on the child. . . ."5 The court found this
despite the father's testimony that he lived in an "active homosexual re-
lationship" and shared a bedroom with his lover in the child's home. 0
The court granted joint legal custody of the child to the father and
mother, but required that the father and his lover not share the same bed
or bedroom.6 1 The court commented that this arrangement constituted
"one of the greatest degrees of flaunting [their sexual relationship] that
one could imagine. '62 Such conduct, held the trial court, "flies in the face
of Brown v. Brown [as well as] . . . society's mores .... ,,13 The supreme
court agreed, but held that this behavior alone was sufficient, as a matter
of law, to find that the father was unfit,64 despite the trial court's finding
that the child had suffered no adverse effects by being exposed to the
53. 228 Va. 722, 324 S.E.2d 691 (1985).
54. Id. at 727, 324 S.E.2d at 693.
55. Id. (quoting Beck v. Beck, 341 So. 2d 580 (La. App. 1977)).
56. Id. at 724, 324 S.E.2d at 692.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 725, 324 S.E.2d at 692 (emphasis added). The child did, however, wish to live
with her mother. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 726, 324 S.E.2d at 693.
62. Id. at 725, 324 S.E.2d at 693.
63. Id. at 725-26, 324 S.E.2d at 693.
64. Id. at 727, 324 S.E.2d at 694.
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relationship. The supreme court thus rejected the nexus approach, mak-
ing it clear that a finding of unfitness does not depend on evidence of
harm to the child. Unmarried cohabitation by itself is sufficient to change
custody because the court presumes that this arrangement is deleterious
to the child.6 5
Based on Brown, the supreme court reversed the joint custody award,
holding that sole custody must be granted to the mother.66 Otherwise, the
court declared, the child would be required to live under conditions that
were not only unlawful but imposed an intolerable burden upon her be-
cause of the social condemnation attached to them, which would "inevita-
bly afflict her relationships with her peers and the community at large.
' ' s7
The court found Mr. Roe's unfitness evident in "his willingness to impose
this burden upon her in exchange for his own gratification."68
65. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
66. Roe, 228 Va. at 727-28, 324 S.E.2d at 694. The court was careful to distinguish its
earlier holding in Doe v. Doe, 224 Va. 736, 284 S.E.2d 799 (1981), in which it declined to
hold that every lesbian mother or homosexual father is per se an unfit parent. Doe was not a
custody case but a disputed adoption. The Roe court pointed out that in Doe the issue was
not the impact of a homosexual relationship upon a child in the context of permanent cus-
tody, but whether a father and stepmother should be permitted to adopt his child over the
lesbian mother's objections. Roe, 228 Va. at 727, 324 S.E.2d at 693-94. Although the Doe
court refused to terminate all parental rights of the mother, it "stopped far short of finding
her a fit and proper custodian for her son" while her female lover continued to live with her.
Jd.
67. Roe, 228 Va. at 728, 324 S.E.2d at 694.
At press time, a Virginia custody dispute involving a homosexual parent unsuccessfully
challenged the legitimacy of Roe. On March 31, 1993, a Henrico County juvenile court judge
transferred custody of two-year-old Tyler Doustou from his lesbian mother, Sharon Bot-
toms, to his grandmother, Kay Bottoms. The transfer was ordered because Sharon Bottoms
and Tyler were living with Ms. Bottoms' lover, April Wade. Deborah Kelly, Sept. 7 Trial
Set in Lesbian's Custody Case, RICHMOND TIMEs-DISPATCH, May 25, 1993, at Bi.
That decision was upheld in the Circuit Court for the County of Henrico on September 7,
1993. In his bench opinion, Judge Buford M. Parsons, Jr., ruled that Sharon Bottoms was
unfit to raise her son. Deborah Kelly, Lesbian Ruled Unfit to Raise 2-Year-Old, RICHMOND
TIMss-DISPATCH, Sept. 8, 1993, at Al. Citing Roe, Judge Parsons noted that oral sodomy,
which Ms. Bottoms admitted to, is a class six felony in Virginia. Id. See VA CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-361 (Repl. Vol. 1988). In addition to finding Ms. Bottoms' conduct immoral and ille-
gal, the judge held that it was potentially damaging to her son because it could create an
"intolerable burden based on social condemnation." Deborah Kelly, Dad Hopes Lesbian Re-
gains Tot, RICHMOND TIzas-DSPATCH, Sept. 13, 1993, at Al. While the judge recognized the
presumption in favor of custody remaining with the biological parent, he determined that
the "circumstances of [Sharon Bottoms'] unfitness ... are . . . of such an extraordinary
nature [that they] rebut this presumption." Deborah Kelly, Lesbian Ruled Unfit to Raise 2-
Year-Old, RICHMOND TIMEs-DISPATCH, Sept. 8, 1993, at Al. In addition, the child's court
appointed guardian ad litem recommended that custody go to the grandmother. Id. Sharon
Bottoms plans to appeal. Id. at Al.
68. Id.
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Although the court's views regarding homosexuality undoubtedly influ-
enced its decision,69 the father in Roe was treated no differently than the
mother in Brown.70 In both cases, the presumption of unfitness was un-
rebuttable. Neither testimony of Mrs. Brown's general care of her chil-
dren,71 her plans to marry her lover,7 2 nor the court's finding that she was
otherwise a fit mother73 was sufficient to overcome the presumption of
unfitness. The Roe court essentially held that no conditions could remove
the unfitness caused by the father's cohabitation with his homosexual
lover.7 4 The supreme court thus viewed unmarried cohabitation as the
critical factor in determining parental fitness for custody.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA AND THE NEXUS APPROACH
Over time, Brown was read more narrowly in light of subsequent Vir-
ginia Court of Appeals decisions. The emphasis in custody cases shifted
from the public policy analysis of moral considerations exemplified by
Brown v. Brown. A nexus argument based on an expansive interpretation
of the minor evidence in Brown relating to the behavioral problems of one
of the children became the focus of the court of appeals.75 While the
nexus standard of evaluation has the potential positive effect of modify-
ing an inflexible supreme court rule against a cohabiting parent ever re-
taining custody, as applied by the court of appeals it has become equally
unyielding toward the non-custodial parent.
A. Brinkley v. Brinkley
Unlike Brown v. Brown and Roe v. Roe, Brinkley v. Brinkley6 did not
involve open cohabitation by a parent Rather, Mr. Brinkley appealed a
grant of sole custody to his wife in a final divorce decree. The divorce
was granted based on Mrs. Brinkley's adultery.
The court of appeals recognized that adultery, without more, is an in-
sufficient basis upon which to find that a parent is unfit.7 8 However, the
69. See Beargie, supra note 29, at 72-86, for an in-depth discussion of homosexuality as it
relates to child custody.
70. See SWISHER, supra note 33, § 15-7, at 629. For a brief overview of the effects of
various sexual lifestyles on child custody and visitation laws, see Robert L. Gottsfield, Child
Custody and Sexual Lifestyle, 23 CONCILIATION CTs. REv. 43 (1985).
71. Brown v. Brown, 218 Va. 196, 198, 237 S.E.2d 89, 91 (1977).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Roe v. Roe, 228 Va. 722, 727, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (1985).
75. Cottrell, supra note 50; see infra note 93.
76. 1 Va. App. 222, 336 S.E.2d 901 (1985).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 224, 336 S.E.2d at 902. See Brown v. Brown, 218 Va. 196, 198, 237 S.E.2d 89, 91
(1977).
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court reiterated Brown's statement that adultery remains "a reflection of
a parent's moral values which should be considered in evaluating the
moral climate in which a child is to be reared."79 Contradictory evidence
of the mother's affair was presented at trial. The father alleged that the
mother's lover visited her home at night for long periods of time. The
mother, however, testified that the child never saw her boyfriend in the
home.80 The trial court made no determination that adultery actually oc-
curred in the child's home, nor did it find evidence of any harmful effects
to the child as a result of the mother's adultery.81
The court of appeals distinguished Brown as a case in which open co-
habitation was compounded by evidence that the relationship adversely
impacted the children, an element the trial court found absent in Brink-
ley.8 2 The court of appeals therefore held that the trial court did not err
in awarding custody to the mother.8 3
The significance of Brinkley lies in the subtle yet distorting twist the
court of appeals added to the Brown rule. The court stated: "[A]s the
Brown decision mandates, in determining a child's best interest, the ex-
tent to which the child is exposed to an illicit relationship must be given
the 'most careful consideration' in a custody proceeding."'" Nowhere in
Brown, however, is there language that requires the court to scrutinize
the extent of a child's exposure to adultery. Brown states: "An illicit rela-
tionship to which minor children are exposed cannot be condoned. Such a
relationship must necessarily be given the most careful consideration in
a custody proceeding." 85 With this seemingly innocuous alteration of the
Brown rule, the court of appeals abandoned the supreme court's pre-
sumption that unmarried cohabitation is tantamount to unfitness and in-
stead embraced the requirement that a nexus between sexual misconduct
and an immediate negative impact on a child be shown.
B. Sutherland v. Sutherland
In 1992, the Court of Appeals of Virginia decided two cases addressing
unmarried cohabitation in the context of a custody determination. The
79. Brinkley, 1 Va. App. at 224, 336 S.E.2d at 902. Neither Sutherland nor Ford quoted
this language, thus it is questionable whether it is still considered a meaningful factor by the
court of appeals. See Sutherland v. Sutherland, 14 Va. App. 42, 414 S.E.2d 617 (1992); Ford
v. Ford, 14 Va. App. 551, 419 S.E.2d 415 (1992).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. For the evidence in Brown which constituted an "adverse impact," see infra note
86. This evidence was relatively minor and pertained to only the eldest son.
83. Brinkley, 1 Va. App. at 224, 336 S.E.2d at 902-03.
84. Id. at 224, 336 S.E.2d at 902 (emphasis added).
85. Brown v. Brown, 218 Va. 196, 199, 237 S.E.2d 89, 91 (1977) (emphasis added).
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decisions acknowledged that Brown still controlled these matters, yet al-
lowed the cohabiting parent to retain custody in both cases.
Sutherland v. Sutherland"' was a father's appeal of a custody award to
the child's mother, who was engaged in a live-in, adulterous relationship
with a man she intended to marry following his divorce.8 7 The father ar-
gued that Brown required custody to be awarded to him. The court of
appeals disagreed, holding that Brown did not establish a per se rule and
therefore did not prevent the trial court from refusing to give the father
custody." The court unconvincingly distinguished Sutherland from
Brown by claiming that evidence of Mrs. Brown's poor housekeeping and
neglect of her children was a factor which aggravated the consequences of
her adulterous relationship and led the court to find her unfit.8 9 However,
Brown expressly states that this evidence was not given any consideration
in determining her lack of fitness."' Only Mrs. Brown's unmarried cohabi-
tation made her an unfit mother in the eyes of the court.9 1
As in Brinkley, the court of appeals noted that a factor in the Brown
decision was the evidence that the mother's conduct had an adverse im-
pact on at least one of the children. 92 While there was evidence in Brown
suggesting that one child might be reacting to his mother's cohabitation,
the supreme court did not emphasize this aspect of the case in its deter-
mination.93 Nevertheless, because none of these concerns was present in
the record before the court of appeals, it left the decision to the discretion
of the trial court "whose judgments will not be reversed in the absence of
a showing that the discretion given has been abused." 4
86. 14 Va. App. 42, 414 S.E.2d 617 (1992).
87. Id. at 43, 414 S.E.2d at 618.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Brown v. Brown, 218 Va. 196, 199, 237 S.E.2d 89, 90-91 (1977); see supra notes 37-39
and accompanying text.
91. Brown, 218 Va. at 199, 237 S.E.2d at 90-91.
92. Sutherland, 14 Va. App. at 44, 414 S.E.2d at 618.
93. At trial, Mr. Brown testified that his older son had developed a hyperactive condition
during the parties' separation, and that this condition seemed to improve while he was in
his father's custody. He also claimed that the child:
particularly and repeatedly pleaded for the return of [Mr. Brown] to the household
and asked repeatedly why the other man was sleeping with Mommie instead of [Mr.
Brown]; That ... [this child] resorted to long periods of silence; That he was irrita-
ble with and slapped his brother and then immediately hugged him; and that he oth-
erwise tended to lose control.
Brown, 218 Va. at 198, 237 S.E.2d at 90. In view of Sutherland and Ford, the adverse im-
pact aspect has become the controlling concern.
94. Sutherland, 14 Va. App. at 44, 414 S.E.2d at 618. In Brinkley, Carrico, Sutherland,
and Ford, the court of appeals showed great deference to the trial court by affirming its
decision in each case. It has been suggested that the true test of whether the court of ap-
peals has totally departed from Brown will come only when a trial court is reversed for
deciding to award custody to the other parent on grounds that the child has been exposed to
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Because the trial court effectively ignored the crucial rule in Brown,
that courts "may not condone . . . exposing the children to adulterous
and immoral contacts",9 5 it is difficult to see how this does not constitute
an abuse of discretion, particularly when it was found that "[t]he children
are often present in the house when the adultery occurs."9 6 Brown explic-
itly stated that a "critical" factor in the decision to modify custody was
that the mother's affairs were conducted "with the children's knowledge
and while they were present in the house. '9 7 The supreme court logically
assumed that unmarried cohabitation inevitably exposes a child to the
relationship.98 Thus, the court could not have intended to give the lower
courts much discretion in this regard. Although the court of appeals re-
peated that the trial court "must consider all the facts"9 in determining
the best interests of the child, it is clear that cohabitation had little, if
any, impact on the trial court's decision.
The outcome of Sutherland was particularly surprising because it ar-
rived on the heels of a prior court of appeals decision involving indiscreet
sexual 'onduct in the context of a child visitation dispute. In Carrico. v.
Blevins,"'0 the court of appeals upheld a trial court's order barring the
mother from having overnight male guests during her child's visitation.
Significantly, the court acknowledged that "[e]xposing children to their
parents' living with persons to whom they are not married has been disfa-
vored by our Supreme Court [sic]. [Brown] held that the fact that the
mother was openly living in an adulterous relationship in the same house
with the children was sufficient cause to change custody."'10 1 This inter-
an immoral environment. See SWISHER, supra note 33, § 15-7, at 59 (Supp. 1992); Carrico v.
Blevins, 12 Va. App. 47, 402 S.E.2d 235 (1991)
95. Brown, 218 Va. at 200, 237 S.E.2d at 91-92 (emphasis added).
96. Sutherland, 14 Va. App. at 43, 414 S.E.2d at 618.
97. Brown, 218 Va. at 200, 237 S.E.2d at 92.
98. See id. at 200, 237 S.E.2d at 92.
99. Sutherland, 14 Va. App. at 44, 414 S.E.2d at 618.
100. 12 Va. App. 47, 402 S.E.2d 235 (1991).
101. Id. at 49, 402 S.E.2d at 237 (citing Brown v. Brown, 218 Va. 196, 237 S.E.2d 89
(1977)) (emphasis added). The Carrico court went on to quote with approval the dissent of
Judge Kenneth Ingram of the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, (now sitting on the Alabama
Supreme Court) in Jones v. Haraway, 537 So. 2d 946 (Ala. App. 1988) in which the judge
recounted that a review of cases from various jurisdictions indicated that visitation restric-
tions were not uncommon. Judge Ingram's dissent is compelling, although the following lan-
guage was not quoted by the Virginia Court of Appeals:
Protection of a child's moral development should properly be a concern of our
courts as part of the judicial search for the best interest of the child. I believe that
courts can and should be involved in preventing the undermining of a child's respect
for marriage and the family. Like the majority, I feel a parent's immoral or indiscreet
conduct is a factor to be evaluated by trial judges in the determination of both cus-
tody and visitation. I would hold, however, that a Court should assign considerable
negative impact to the conduct of a parent who engages in continuous or repeated
immoral or indiscreet sexual relationships, such as cohabitation out of wedlock. ...
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pretation of Brown contradicts the view of the same court in Ford v.
Ford1 2 and Sutherland.
In addition, the Sutherland court disregarded the language in Brown
which announced that non-marital cohabitation automatically triggers a
presumption that the child will be harmed."' 3 Brown did not require a
finding of immediate manifestation of harm in order to change custody.
Also, the trial court should not have been influenced by Mrs. Sutherland's
claim that she eventually intended to marry her paramour. The mother in
Brown made the same claim, yet the court did not consider this testi-
mony sufficient to rebut the presumption of adverse effect. 0 4
Sutherland significantly departs from the holding in Roe v. Roe, where
the supreme court ignored the trial court's failure to find evidence that
the father's conduct had an adverse effect on his child. The fact that soci-
etal condemnation would eventually burden the child was seen as suffi-
cient reason to be concerned for her well-being. 0 5 The father's homosexu-
ality in Roe should not obscure the fact that the supreme court was
addressing unlawful sexual behavior in a child's presence. 06 It neither
expressly nor impliedly confined this proscription to homosexuality. In
fact, Roe was firmly based on the belief that exposing children to unmar-
ried cohabitation, regardless of whether it is heterosexual or homosexual,
is "in total disregard of the moral principles of our society.. ." and thus
renders the offending parent "morally unfit" for custody. 07 Thus, by ig-
noring the supreme court's presumption of unfitness and requiring proof
of a nexus between cohabitation and harm to the child, Sutherland repre-
sents a radically altered approach to determining a child's best interests
in a custody proceeding.
Jones, 537 So. 2d at 951 (Ingram, J., dissenting). This dissent was prompted by the major-
ity's refusal to presume a detrimental effect from the child's knowledge of such conduct,
requiring instead a showing of "substantial detrimental effect" upon the child. Randall W.
Nichols, Modifying Child Custody Decisions Because of Indiscreet Sexual Behavior -
Changing Times and an Elusive Standard, 52 ALA. LAW. 36, 38 (Jan. 1991). Judge Ingram's
chief concern was that appellate courts had begun to insist upon equating "substantial det-
rimental effect" with "tangible harm." Id. at 39.
102. 14 Va. App. 551, 419 S.E.2d 415 (1992).
103. See Brown, 218 Va. at 199-200, 237 S.E.2d at 91.
104. Id.
105. See Roe v. Roe, 228 Va. 722, 727, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (1985).
106. See id.
107. Id. at 727, 324 S.E.2d at 693-94. Compare Id., 228 Va. at 727, 324 S.E.2d at 693
(referring to a mother as morally unfit as a result of her "open and public adultery with her
paramour for a substantial period of time, in total disregard of the moral principles of our
society .. ") with id., 228 Va. at 722, 324 S.E.2d at 694 (finding a father an unfit and
improper custodian because of his "continuous exposure of the child to his immoral and
illicit relationship. .. ").
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C. Ford v. Ford
Three months after Sutherland v. Sutherland,1 8 the court of appeals
turned its back on the Brown determination that adulterous cohabitation
is sufficient grounds to change custody. In Ford v. Ford,0 9 the court of
appeals reached a particularly disturbing decision when it allowed a fa-
ther involved in an adulterous relationship to retain custody of his six-
year-old daughter after he moved with her into his lover's home."10 Dur-
ing the custody trial, Mr. Ford maintained his, residence at the former
marital home, where he lived with the couple's daughter, Christina."' Mr.
Ford's lover, Dr. Marciana Wilkerson, testified that she and Mr. Ford
were sleeping together and that Mr. Ford and Christina spent nights at
her house on a regular basis." 2 Nevertheless, the trial court awarded Mr.
and Mrs. Ford joint legal and shared physical custody of the child, with
Mr. Ford having primary physical custody during the school year.lls
Following the trial, but prior to the entry of the custody decree, Mr.
Ford moved from the marital home into his paramour's house. 11 4 Mrs.
Ford then filed a motion for reconsideration asking that primary physical
custody be transferred to her due to Mr. Ford's misconduct.1 5 The trial
court denied this motion and the court of appeals affirmed."'
The court of appeals looked to the language of Brinkley,'" rather than
Brown,'" 8 to determine that the "standard governing our review of this
issue is 'the extent to which the child is exposed to an illicit relation-
ship.' "' Based on this distorted version of the Brown'" rule, the court
painstakingly reviewed the evidence to discover whether the child had
been exposed to the "intimate nature" of her father's adulterous relation-
ship.' 2 ' Such an analysis was not contemplated by Brown, which held that
108. 14 Va. App. 42, 414 S.E.2d 617 (1992).
109. 14 Va. App. 551, 419 S.E.2d 415 (1992).
110. Id. at 555, 419 S.E.2d at 418.
111. Id. at 552, 419 S.E.2d at 416.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 553, 419 S.E.2d at 417.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See generally SWISHER supra note 33, § 15-7, at 58 (Supp. 1992). James Ray Cot-
trell, the author who wrote this section of the book, was Mrs. Ford's attorney before the
court of appeals.
117. Brinkley v. Brinkley, 1 Va. App. 222, 224, 336 S.E.2d 901, 902 (1985).
118. Brown v. Brown, 218 Va. 196, 199, 237 S.E.2d 89, 91 (1977).
119. Ford, 14 Va. App. at 555, 419 S.E.2d at 418 (emphasis added) (quoting Brinkley v.
Brinkley, 1 Va. App. 222, 336 S.E.2d 901 (1985)).
120. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
121. Ford, 14 Va. App. at 554-55, 419 S.E.2d at 417.
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adulterous cohabitation by its very nature exposes the child to the illicit
relationship.'22
Despite the fact that Mr. Ford moved his child into his lover's home,
the court insisted that this was not determinative of the extent to which
the child was "exposed to the intimate nature of [their] relationship. ''123
Dr. Wilkerson testified that she and Mr. Ford slept together on a regular
basis, presumably while the child was in the same house, before Mr. Ford
and Christina moved in with her.L24 In addition, Dr. Wilkerson admitted
that she and Mr. Ford were currently sleeping together. However, the
court was impressed by testimony that they "maintained" separate bed-
rooms at her house.12 5 The court of appeals gave great weight to evidence
"that proved" that Mr. Ford and his lover had made "every effort to es-
tablish for Christina a nonthreatening, platonic relationship.2 26 For ex-
ample, evidence was introduced that Mr. Ford and Dr. Wilkerson stayed
in separate hotel rooms when they traveled with the child. 2 7 The court
also considered the couple's open discussions with the child about their
ultimate intention to marry, 2 " despite the Brown court's refusal to allow
such intentions to rebut the presumption of harm.2 9 The Ford court thus
concluded that no evidence that Christina was actually exposed to her
father's adultery had been introduced.'3 °
The Ford court also denied that it was controlled by Roe, which it
maintained turned on the issue of the father's homosexuality.131 This is
an extremely narrow interpretation of Roe, which was a broad indictment
of unlawful sexual conduct in the same house in which a child lived.132
Although the Roe court linked its decision to societal condemnation of
the father's relationship, the Ford court implicitly denied that heterosex-
ual affairs to which a child was exposed were similarly disapproved.'
122. Brown, 218 Va. at 200, 237 S.E.2d at 92 (1977).
[Mrs. Brown's] adulterous relationship was admitted. They were openly cohabitating
in the presence of her two young children. [She] had maintained her home under
these conditions over an extended period of time .... The [trial] court therefore
ruled that ... by reason of her adulterous relationship ... in the same residence of
which the minor children also lived, that [she] was not a fit and proper person to
have the care and custody of the minor children of the parties.
Id. at 199-200, 237 S.E.2d at 91-92.
123. Ford, 14 Va. App. at 554-55, 419 S.E.2d at 417.
124. Id. at 555, 419 S.E.2d at 418.
125. Id. at 553, 419 S.E.2d 416-17.
126. Id. at 555, 419 S.E.2d at 418.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See supra text accompanying note 104.
130. Ford, 14 Va. App. at 556, 419 S.E.2d at 418.
131. Id. at 555-56, 419 S.E.2d at 418.
132. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
133. Ford, 14 Va. App. at 555-56, 419 S.E.2d at 418.
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The court thereby overlooked the supreme court's condemnation of both
homosexual and heterosexual cohabitation in Brown and Roe.
Finally, the Ford court claimed that a critical issue in Roe was the fa-
ther's failure to "shield" his child from the illicit nature of his relation-
ship.134 The supreme court, however, did not allow Mr. Roe to have joint
custody even on the condition that he and his lover maintain separate
bedrooms. 1 5 The court was persuaded that the "child's awareness of the
nature of the father's illicit relationship is fixed and cannot be dispelled
. . .The impact of such behavior upon the child . . . is inevitable."'36
Although Ford contained no evidence that the relationship had an ad-
verse effect on the child, and the court was impressed by testimony that
efforts were made to hide the sexual nature of the relationship from the
child, these factors should not have indicated that the cohabitation was
consistent with the child's best interests.
D. Problems with the Nexus Approach and the Need for a Rebuttable
Presumption
Brown v. Brown and Roe v. Roe emphasized that adverse effects on
children are presumed whenever unmarried cohabitation is part of a
child's home environment.137 While the court of appeals has not con-
strued this as a conclusive presumption, supreme court precedent clearly
requires that cohabitation be considered when determining custody.'"
The Isaacs and Leon study illustrates the legitimacy of this considera-
tion. 39 Disturbingly, however, Sutherland and Ford demonstrate that
unmarried cohabitation, at least between heterosexuals, has become irrel-
evant in the absence of proof of direct harm to the children exposed to
it. 140
In focusing on the extent of the child's exposure to the sexual nature of
the cohabiting relationship, the court of appeals has bound the best inter-
ests of the child to a nearly impossible standard of proof that requires
both evidence of misconduct in the presence of the child and immediate
proof that the child has been harmed by this behavior. The court's deci-
sion now apparently turns on nothing other than the testimony of the
cohabiting couple that the child is never exposed to inappropriate behav-
ior.'4 ' It is doubtful that the non-custodial parent will be able to prove
134. Id. at 556, 419 S.E.2d at 418.
135. Roe v. Roe, 228 Va. 722, 728, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (1985).
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. See Brown v. Brown, 218 Va. 196, 199, 237 S.E.2d 89, 91 (1977); Roe v. Roe, 228 Va.
722, 728, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (1985).
138. See Brown, 218 Va. at 199, 287 S.E.2d at 91.
139. See Isaacs & Leon, supra notes 7-23 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Sutherland v. Sutherland, 14 Va. App. 42, 44, 414 S.E.2d 617, 618 (1992).
141. Cottrell, supra note 51, at 2.
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otherwise. The custodial parent is extremely unlikely to produce a psychi-
atrist as an expert witness unless the psychiatrist plans to testify that the
child is thriving in that parent's care. Furthermore, an opinion rendered
by the American Psychiatric Association Ethics Committee indicates that
a psychiatrist may not examine a child at the request of a non-custodial
parent and without consent of the custodial parent, then testify in court
about the child.142 Thus, the non-custodial parent is hampered in his or
her efforts to introduce contradictory expert testimony. Moreover, espe-
cially in the case of a young child, it may take several years before the
deleterious effects are manifested in a tangible way.
43
The nexus approach as applied recently by the court of appeals does
not consider either the moral dimension of cohabitation or the potentially
harmful long-term effects it has on children. While cohabitation should
not be the sole litmus test by which fitness for custody is determined,
neither should it be ignored. 14 4 Even if the court of appeals finds nothing
morally troubling in unmarried cohabitation, such a relationship certainly
warrants close judicial scrutiny when the emotional health of a child is at
stake.
A standard which establishes a rebuttable presumption that cohabita-
tion is harmful would return the burden of proof to the cohabiting par-
ent, whose conduct threatens to harm the child. This standard would give
the cohabiting parent the opportunity to produce evidence that his or her
child is either not susceptible to the harmful effects of unmarried cohabi-
tation, or that the alternative of shifting custody to the other parent
would be more damaging to the child than the negative impact of the
cohabitation. For example, if a child is happy, well-adjusted, and well
cared for in the custody of one parent, removing the child from this atmo-
sphere, even into the custody of an equally fit parent, does not serve the
child's best interests. 4 A rebuttable presumption would avoid the harsh
consequences of a rule where cohabitation is conclusive evidence of unfit-
ness. This standard would also modify the nexus rule as presently ap-
plied, which presents significant problems of proof for the non-custodial
parent given the court's tendency to consider only immediate manifesta-
tions of harm, rather than potentially harmful long-range effects.
A rebuttable presumption is also a meaningful guideline for trial courts,
which have varied in their treatment of cohabitation as a factor. Testi-
mony by the cohabiting parent that the extent of the child's exposure to
the sexual nature of the non-marital relationship is slight should not be
sufficient to rebut the presumption of harmfulness, since this substan-
142. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS OF THE ETHICS COMMITTEE ON THE
PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 4-M (1992) (on file with author).
143. See Isaacs & Leon, supra notes 7 and text accompanying notes 7-28.
144. Cottrell, supra note 51, at 1.
145. Beargie, supra note 29, at 84.
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tially misconstrues the rule in Brown v. Brown and can only result in a
"rote mimicry" of the evidence presented by the cohabiting couple in
Ford v. Ford.148 This "extent of the exposure" analysis is also undermined
by the fact that there is no evidence that a child must actually see sexual
behavior to be adversely affected by it.
A rebuttable presumption would reinstate non-marital cohabitation as
a factor in custody modification cases, thereby satisfying supreme court
precedent and acknowledging psychological evidence that children are
likely to be harmed when exposed to such living situations. Moreover, the
rebuttable presumption avoids absolute preferences for either parent, so
that the overall goal of meeting the child's best interests is not eclipsed
by extreme rules on either side.
V. CONCLUSION
In order to obtain a shift in custody where unmarried cohabitation is a
factor, the court of appeals now demands evidence that a parent's sexual
misconduct has occurred in the child's physical presence and that it be
directly linked to a present showing that the child has been harmed by
such behavior.247
The judicial pendulum in Virginia custody cases has swung from a
seemingly conclusive presumption which sided with the non-custodial
parent to the current use of the nexus approach which is weighted en-
tirely in favor of the cohabiting parent. A child's best interests cannot be
met by either extreme. While the supreme court's approach under Brown
v. Brown made cohabitation the critical factor in finding unfitness, the
unfortunate trend of the court of appeals has been to require that, for
unmarried cohabiting to become a factor, the harmful effect of cohabita-
tion on the child must be proven by direct evidence. Non-marital cohabi-
tation has thus become irrelevant in the absence of a showing of immedi-
ate harm to the child.
The Isaacs and Leon study supports the supreme court's presumption
that a child whose parent cohabits with a lover is likely to be harmed by
that parent's choice, although it may take several years for such harm to
become apparent.'4 8 By failing to scrutinize such relationships with great
care, except to the extent that a child has actually seen sexual behavior
between the cohabiting couple, the court of appeals has liberally con-
ceded to unmarried cohabitation. This concession allows the custodial
parent to pursue his or her sexual freedom at the potential expense of a
child's well-being. The current burden of proof imposed on the non-custo-
146. Id. at 2. See Ford v. Ford, 14 Va. App. 551, 555, 419 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1992).
147. See Sutherland v. Sutherland, 14 Va. App. 42, 44, 414 S.E.2d 617, 618 (1992); Ford,
14 Va. App. at 556, 419 S.E.2d at 418.
148. See Isaacs & Leon, supra notes 7-28 and accompanying text.
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dial parent leaves many children in living situations which may perma-
nently scar their emotional health. Instituting a rebuttable presumption
that non-marital cohabitation is harmful to children would rightfully
subordinate a parent's right to cohabit freely to a child's paramount right
to a stable environment, yet allow for a fair consideration of which parent
can best provide that environment.
Katharine A. Salmon
